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: The Truth (of the Matter Asserted) Is out There

THE TRUTH (OF THE MATTER ASSERTED) IS OUT THERE: LAW AND
THE PARANORMAL OUTSIDE THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Christopher L. Henry, Esq*
“We all know that just being a lawyer doesn’t make a man a magician or give
him supernatural powers. Only an appointment to the federal judiciary can do that.”
- Dewitt Hale, former chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the Texas House of
Representatives1
“There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.”
- Hamlet (1.5.167-8), Hamlet to Horatio2
I. THE ROLE OF THE PARANORMAL IN THE COURTROOM:3 AN INTRODUCTION
Many of the oldest cases discussing the paranormal speak disdainfully of the
then-recent past in which mental illness was believed to be a sign of possession by
________________________
*
Christopher L. Henry, University of Louisville Brandeis School of Law, magna cum laude. He is
currently a staff attorney at the Kentucky Court of Appeals. Special thanks to Hon. Judge Michael Henry.
1.
GARY CARTWRIGHT, DIRTY DEALING, DRUG SMUGGLING ON THE MEXICAN BOARDER AND THE
ASSASSINATION OF A FEDERAL JUDGE 126 (1998).
2.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. V. (Harold Jenkins ed., Methuen Pub. Ltd. 1982).
3.
The scope of this article requires some explanation. As a general rule, this article ignores constitutional
law. The Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause are the subject of a great deal of academic discussion
elsewhere. See, e.g., Alan Stephens, Annotation, Free Exercise of Religion Clause of First Amendment as Defense
to Tort Liability, 93 A.L.R. FED. 754 (1989). I have taken care not to retread too much scholarly ground. Because it
is difficult to extricate these two topics entirely, the First Amendment is mentioned when necessary. The First
Amendment was excluded from this article not only because it has been explored academically, but also because a
court is unlikely to actually address a claim of the paranormal in the context of the First Amendment.
This article will also generally not discuss intellectual property law or tax law. (As an aside, some interesting dicta
on the supernatural and copyright is included in Penguin Books U.S.A., Inc. v. New Christian Church of Full
Endeavor, Ltd., No. 96 Civ. 4126 (RWS), 2000 WL 1028634, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2000), vacated, No. 96 Civ.
4126 (RWS), 2004 WL 906301 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2004) (“As a matter of law, it is irrelevant for copyright purposes
whether Jesus wrote the Course.”)). This article does discuss many instances in which courts have decided matters
dealing with litigants who profess a belief in the supernatural. This is because in these instances, as opposed to cases
concerning tax or intellectual property, a person’s subjective belief in the paranormal might affect the merits of the
underlying claim. In the section of the article concerning beliefs in the paranormal, there are many cases involving
outlandish facts. These cases were chosen because they underscore the extent of the testator’s belief in the
paranormal. It is also true that this article features lengthy quotations. This is because the article’s primary focus
concerns how courts have treated the paranormal. In some cases, it is necessary to provide the court’s extended
discussion if it is particularly illustrative of judicial attitudes towards the paranormal. These attitudes are best
demonstrated through the text itself. Finally, this article discusses the “supernatural” and the “paranormal”
interchangeably. This was not intended to offend anyone with religious sensibilities; this article merely discusses
any subject that cannot be exchanged through conventional methods. For a brief article with a similar theme, see
Christopher R. Brauchli, From the Wool-Sack, 24 COLO. LAW. 547 (1995).
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the devil.4 In more recent times, of course, courts generally try to separate the
supernatural from the courtroom entirely.5 Still, much of modern law has its origins
in the supernatural.6
Perhaps the division between the supernatural and the law was best described in
a dissent by one judge in an 1887 murder case. In Parsons v. State, the defendant
claimed that she was under the supernatural influence of her husband at the time of
the crime.7 The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed her conviction, but Chief Justice
George Stone offered a particularly colorful dissent.8 Judge Stone pointed out the
contradiction in calling one woman insane for believing something that was once
generally accepted, but ultimately concluded that the inquiry was outside the realm
of the justiciable:
Was her alleged delusion insanity? Was it, if it existed, a disease of
the reasoning faculty? What say psychological experts on this
subject? . . . Less than three centuries ago the whole Englishspeaking people labored under this delusion or superstition, and
called it witchcraft. So firmly did they believe it that they made the
practice of it a capital felony. Many unfortunates to whom this dark
art was imputed paid the penalty by the most torturing of all known
methods of inflicting the death sentence. Were our ancestors, from
the king on his throne to the laboring peasant, all insane? Even the
great and good Sir MATTHEW HALE was a believer in witchcraft.
He said “that there were such creatures as witches he made no doubt
at all; for, -First, the Scriptures had affirmed so much; secondly, the
wisdom of all nations had provided laws against such persons,
which is an argument of their confidence in such crime.” On the
other hand, if the great, the noble, and the learned, two or three
________________________
4.
See, e.g., State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 436 (N.H. Super. Ct. 1870), overruled in part by Hardy v. Merrill,
56 N.H. 227 (N.H. Super. Ct. 1875).
Witchcraft and demoniacal possession were accepted as truths taught by miraculous
inspiration. Cases of insanity were found, answering the biblical description of cases of
demoniacal possession; but the suggestion that any of the latter might be cases of mental or
physical disease, was received as an attack upon the infallibility of the scriptures.
Id. at 436. See also Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1299 (E.D. Pa. 1977) aff’d in
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev’d sub nom.
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (“Connecticut’s first house of correction in 1722
was for rogues, vagabonds, the idle, beggars, fortune tellers, diviners, musicians, runaways, drunkards, prostitutes,
pilferers, brawlers and the mentally afflicted . . . .”).
5.
Even when a judge or court expresses approval of the supernatural, it is often done as passing reference,
rather than in a situation in which one of the parties alleges that something supernatural had happened. See, for
example, Borders v. Rippey, 184 F. Supp. 402, 406 (N.D. Tex. 1960), a desegregation case in which the court stated,
“[q]uite different is the confused, latterday delinquent who now has no dream of immortality or no faith of his own
and who thinks supernatural and superstition are twin words and that the devil and Santa Claus are one person and
that’s nobody but pa.”
6.
One example is the swearing in of the witness. “Instead of constituting a form of evidence, courts came
to conceive of the oath as a vehicle for strongly reminding a witness of the supernatural punishment in store for him
should he testify falsely, thus putting him in a frame of mind calculated to tell the truth.” In re R. R., 398 A.2d 76,
81 (N.J. 1979).
7.
See Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854, 876–77 (Ala. 1887) (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
8.
Id. at 867.
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centuries ago, slaughtered men and women indiscriminately as the
imputed possessors of this demoniacal power, and under all the
forms of law and for the public welfare, is it right to make an
example of one ignorant, superstitious woman, if she destroyed one
life as the only means, to her benighted vision, of saving her own?
Of course this is stated on the hypothesis that she really believed her
husband possessed and was exercising this dangerous power.
Let us pursue this line of thought a little further. In the world are
very many religious faiths, each, perhaps, asserting a divine or
supernatural inspiration. Take three of the most prominent, the
Christian, the Mohammedan, and the Buddhist, each numbering its
adherents by the hundred millions. With each of these faiths the
profession of the other two are mere superstitions or hallucinations.
Are the invocations to Allah and to the Enlightened One any more
an illusion to our comprehension than Christian worship is to theirs?
Our faith, we maintain, is founded alike on Divine revelation and
the inherent evidences of its purity and truth. Is their mental delusion
a species of partial insanity? And if, in the zeal of the religion of
Mohammed, propagation by the sword is believed to be a duty, is
such act to be excused on the score of mental illusion? What of the
believers in spiritualistic materializations, mind-reading, and the
many other isms which live their brief day, and are not without a
following? Are the believers in such supernatural power mentally
diseased? Such inquiries may be amusing, if not interesting, to the
visionary and speculative. They can only bewilder, when applied to
the actual transactions of business life. Judicial administration is too
real to enter upon such doubtful and dangerous speculations.9
Another case featured similar language concerning the supernatural in a preface
to a discussion concerning beliefs in the supernatural and testamentary capacity:
[D]r. Carver, a very intelligent medical witness, who had been in the
Western mines, testified: “I have seen hundreds of men in the
mountains, who came there on dreams, including lawyers, doctors,
and priests. Business men here in Monroe have been and searched
for minerals under the direction of clairvoyants.” Others believe in
Christian Science; others in clairvoyance; others in the
transmigration of souls, and others in witchcraft. To affirm or deny
the truth of these things proves nothing, and demonstrates the
individual to be neither a sage or a fool. Who shall be the judge
whether the mind that accepts or reflects them is the truly sane
mind? If we affirm that witches do not ride broomsticks and practice
their evil arts upon us, and that there are no witches, then we have
________________________
9.

Id. at 876.
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Blackstone, the father of our common law, Chief Justice Mathew
Hale, Coke, Sir Francis Bacon, Richard Baxter, John Wesley Martin
Luther, Cotton Mather, and a host of other eminent jurists and
savants, against us.10
By its very definition, the paranormal is outside the realm of accepted science.11
How, then, can normally objective judges approach a situation in which the
supernatural lingers on the fringes of a case? At least one court has directly addressed
this problem, in which the appellant argued that the appellee should have been
required to prove actual supernatural intervention in order to prove that an “act of
God” occurred.12 The court noted that “there are many jurors who may be so
awestricken by the concept of a divine manifestation that they cannot give to the
facts the down-to-earth, tangible, mathematical analysis and deliberation which is
required for a secular verdict.”13 Furthermore,
[t]here is, or should be something inwardly disturbing about asking
a jury to determine what part of an accident was caused by man and
what part was wrought by the hand of God, and then to apportion
the several liabilities. Is this within the capacity of twelve mortal
men and women?14
The court seemed to ultimately conclude that it was not; it reversed the decision of
the trial court with instructions to use language other than “act of God,”
incorporating “the usual and expected operation of the machinery of the universe.”15
Many in law (and probably most) believe that the paranormal has no place in a
legal discussion, as “[t]he law has often embraced a relatively uncritical view of
science’s claims of universal truth.”16 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that
when all but one scientifically accepted explanation for a viewpoint is disproven,
it is idle to argue that there could possibly be another explanation
which lies in the realm of the unknowable and unascertainable and
then expect a jury to base its verdict on that mysterious something

________________________
10.
Owen v. Crumbaugh, 81 N.E. 1044, 1052 (Ill. 1907) (quoting In re Chafin’s Will Case, 32 Wis. 557, 564
(Wis. 1873) (citations omitted)).
11.
“Paranormal” is defined as “very strange and not able to be explained by what scientists know about
nature and the world.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/paranormal (last
visited Mar. 18, 2016).
12.
Goldberg v. R. Grier Miller & Sons, Inc., 182 A.2d 759, 760 (Pa. 1962).
13.
Id. at 761.
14.
Id.
15.
Id. at 765.
16.
Jeffery Atik, Science and International Regulatory Convergence, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 736, 746
(1997). For a discussion of the demarcation between “good science” and “junk science,” see Gary Edmond & David
Mercer, Trashing “Junk Science”, 1998 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (1998).

https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol21/iss2/3

4

: The Truth (of the Matter Asserted) Is out There

Spring 2016

The Truth (of the Matter Asserted) is Out There

199

which exists only in the misty shadowlands of shrouded mystery and
supernatural supposition.17
In fact, injecting religion into the courtroom might even be a basis for
disciplinary action against a judge. For example, in one case, a judge was disciplined
when he suggested in chambers that a juvenile defendant in a case “might be
possessed by demons and that a local priest should examine him to determine
whether an exorcism was required. Respondent then called a separate meeting with
the boy’s parents and told them the same thing.”18 The judge also gave another
defendant a card with a religious poem, and in a separate case, “Respondent, while
wearing judicial robes, descended from the bench and physically embraced the
defendant as a ‘brother in Christ.’”19
There is little law concerning the dividing line between the paranormal and
professional ethics, and what little exists is not very instructive. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of California has stated that a client is not
entitled to have counsel who believes in the paranormal in order to be effective.20
Similarly, it is not ineffective assistance of counsel if counsel believes in the
paranormal but does not act on those beliefs at trial.21 Perhaps a more interesting
ineffective assistance of counsel scenario involves counsel’s failure to extricate
references to a defendant’s work in the paranormal. In United States v. Gent, the
court found no error where several prospective jurors in voir dire expressed
skepticism as to whether they could fairly consider the defendant’s testimony,
knowing that he claimed to have psychic abilities.22
The view that the paranormal should be kept separate from the courtroom is
perhaps best summarized in a law review article by Daniel M. Warner, a professor
at Western Washington University. He compared those who profess beliefs in the
paranormal and those who do not:
Now assume that one was able to choose between two groups of
people to colonize a new territory or to serve as good citizens in a
participatory democracy. This first group tends to be relatively less
intelligent, less well-adjusted, less able to sort out fact from fantasy,
less capable of critical thinking, and more gullible. Its members tend
to have poor self-images and feelings of incompetence. Some
members of the group have a tendency toward unhealthy cultism.
The second group, necessarily by this comparison, is more
intelligent, better adjusted, has a better self-image, is better able to
engage in critical thinking, and so on. Which group to chose?
________________________
17.
Battistone v. Benedetti, 122 A.2d 536, 539 (Pa. 1956).
18.
Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd. of Sup. Ct. of Pa. v. Fink, 532 A.2d 358, 368 (Pa. 1987).
19.
Id.
20.
See Lizarraga v. Pliler, No. CIVS011062MCEJFMP, 2005 WL 1704371, at *17–19 (E.D. Cal. July 14,
2005).
21.
See Neelley v. Alabama, 642 So. 2d 494, 498 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (Counsel testified that he was a
mystic and had the ability to “sparkle” and send “blue beams of energy.”).
22.
See United States v. Gent, No. 10–CR–90S, 2012 WL 1899159, at *11–14 (W.D.N.Y. 2012).
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Obviously the second group, a group more likely to be successful
and more likely to overcome the challenges of hard times. And if,
instead of leaving one group behind, it was possible to change the
mindset of the first group more toward that of the second group,
such a change would seem worthwhile and beneficial. The law can
do so . . . .23
Finally, in at least one case, In re Beale’s Estate, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin seemed to actually indicate that it believed that something paranormal
had happened during the course of the judicial proceedings:24
A few days before Christmas, 1959, Beale, who had returned to
Madison, directed Mrs. Burleigh to re-type the altered pages 12 and
13 on the same typewriter she had used when she first typed the will.
We may guess that Beale wanted pages which did not show they had
been tampered with, as was apparent on the two original sheets now
showing erasures and re-typed corrections. We may guess, further,
that Beale intended to insert in the will without discovery the new
pages without republication and re-execution of the will. This is no
more than guesswork and is of no consequence. Before Mrs.
Burleigh typed the two new sheets Beale’s death intervened on
December 27, 1959. Whatever his purpose, nefarious or not, he did
not accomplish it. Mrs. Burleigh had not begun this final typing
when she was told that Professor Beale had died. She then typed the
two pages as Professor Beale directed and gave them to Beale’s son,
Henry. There were then no marginal initials on them. These pages
are in evidence and, although Professor Beale never in his life had
them or saw them, his initials are now on the margin of each of these
pages and, as Mrs. Burleigh testified, are in his handwriting.

________________________
23.
Daniel M. Warner, Caveat Spritus: A Jurisprudential Reflection upon the Law of Haunted Houses and
Ghosts, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 207, 222 (1993).
24.
Though not exactly alleged to be paranormal by the court, the United States Tax Court was tasked with
determining whether money obtained in the following situation constituted “income”:
Before the $5,000 was handed over, petitioner requested that Thomas spit in the chicken’s
mouth. Petitioner explained that if the chicken then died, everything was going to be all right
as far as the spirits were concerned. The death of the chicken would be a good omen. Thomas
spat into the chicken’s mouth and apparently a short time later the chicken did in fact die.
Petitioner was holding the fowl at the time. There is no positive indication in the record as to
the cause of death or whether or not Thomas was impressed thereby. However, after the
chicken had expired and the omens were deemed favorable, he promptly turned over the
$5,000 to petitioner . . . .
Marks v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 80 (T.C. 1968).
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We began with a consideration of the unnatural. At the end we are
confronted by the supernatural. We consider ourselves fortunate that
this weird addition to the facts turns out to be immaterial.25
Regardless of the views of individual judges and academics, the paranormal presents
a unique problem in law.
First, this article examines situations in which the paranormal has been the
subject of a lawsuit but in which the court did not have to actually “reach the merits”
of the actual claim of the paranormal. For example, this section includes situations
in which a court is confronted with a question of a belief in the paranormal by one
of the parties, and the court has evaluated the situation as affecting his or her legal
mental capacity. The next section of this article discusses situations in which a court
discussed some aspect of the paranormal in order to decide the underlying claim.
Like many of the cases discussing the paranormal, this article does not have a
conclusion as does a typical law review article. It is intended to be a thought exercise
in order to challenge the reader to consider the appropriate scope of the law. It seeks
to provoke the reader into considering two questions. First, how does a court focus
its discussion of the paranormal when it is unnecessary? Second, should courts ever
engage in such a discussion, even when such a claim concerns the merits of an
action? In considering these questions, the reader must inevitably come to a
conclusion regarding the appropriate role for courts of law in society.
II. NON-SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF CLAIMS
A. Belief in the Paranormal as Affecting One’s Mental Capacity in
Contexts Other than Criminal Law
Most jurisdictions hold that a belief in the paranormal does not invalidate a will
as long as that belief does not affect the testator’s mental capacity.26 Perhaps the most
eccentric testator claimed to have owned a “book to work spells, cure fever and ague
and raise spirits,”27 as well as a “rod that would attract . . . money.”28 The testator
used this magic rod to find a pot of money but when he did, however, “a great black
and white spotted bull came running over the hill,”29 that “pawed and hooked the dirt
________________________
25.
26.
(2016)).

Estate of Beale v. Beale, 113 N.W.2d 380, 388 (Wis. 1962).
See, e.g., Rice v. Henderson, 83 S.E.2d 762, 767 (W. Va. 1954) (quoting 79 AM. JUR. 2D Wills § 86
A testator’s belief that he was saved from harm on several occasions by a guiding spirit does
not establish insane delusions on his part. Indeed, it seems to be the settled law that
testamentary capacity cannot be determined alone by what one believes, nor by the character
of the tales he tells concerning spirits, spooks, and supernatural things. Even a belief in
witchcraft is not necessarily conclusive evidence of insanity.

Id.
27.
28.
29.

Thompson v. Thompson, 21 Barb. 107, 123 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1855).
Id.
Id.
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as if he was mad.”30 The bull looked “as big as a mountain”31 to the testator, and
upon seeing the bull “[t]here [came] nearly a thousand cattle . . . that came and passed
diagonally over another hill opposite, which acted just like that bull.”32 The court
recounted another story in which the testator traded a pair of horses worth $180 for
an old horse “not worth ten dollars,” “in consequence of a dream” had by one of his
relatives.33 The testator also stated that if he was to “line a room with white Irish
linen . . . and keep [a man] drunk six months on strong beer . . . at the end of six
months, that man’s urine would be the water of life.”34 The testator also claimed to
know that there were spirits on the moon and in the sky and that he had been
“hugged” by a ghost.35 The court, in affirming the will, stated “[e]rroneous, foolish,
and even absurd opinions upon certain subjects do not show insanity when the person
entertaining them still continues in the possession of his faculties, discreetly
conducting not only his own affairs, but the business of others.”36
In another case, a man believed that upon his death “his soul would enter into
the body of some animal, and that, influenced by that decision, he executed the will
propounded, with a view to the better security of his future existence.”37 The court
upheld the will in this case as well, as the man’s beliefs were not evidence of his
insanity.38 Another court found a testator to be sane in the following circumstances:
[T]hat after he became a Spiritualist his social life changed; that he
cared chiefly for the society of Spiritualists; that when talking upon
the question of Spiritualism he sometimes became excited, and
would often break down and cry; that he thought he heard the voices
of the dead in the seance room and out of it; that he thought he saw
the forms of the dead; that they stood before him and conversed with
him, both in the seance room and out of it; that his dead mother came
up through the floor in the seance room and put her arms around his
neck and kissed him; that his son, whom he called ‘Bright Eyes,’
and who died at 6 weeks of age, came back to him in the form of a
man and patted him on the cheek; that he thought he had a spirit
guide, who directed him in his affairs, and who came to his bed each
night and told him good night; that these conditions existed both
before and after the signing of the supposed will . . . .39
The court noted:
________________________
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id. (emphasis removed).
Id.
Thompson, 21 Barb. at 124 (emphasis removed).
Id. (emphasis removed).
Id.
Id. at 107.
In re Bonard, 16 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 128, 130 (Surr. Ct. 1872).
Id. at 128.
Owen v. Crumbaugh, 81 N.E. 1044, 1054 (Ill. 1907).
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It can never be held that because a testator believes in the doctrines
of a particular church, and because of his preference for the one
rather than the other he makes his will with a view of promoting the
interests of his peculiar denomination, this face is to be accepted as
evidence of insanity.40
The general rule that one’s belief in the paranormal does not affect his or her legal
capacity applies in other contexts as well. For example, one New York court found
that a belief in the supernatural was not sufficient to grant a modification of a child
custody order.41
B. Criminal Law
1. Belief in the Supernatural in Criminal Law
Today, an unreasonable fear (including fear of the supernatural) can provide a
defense in a criminal prosecution.42 However, as in other contexts, a belief in the
paranormal does not necessarily provide the basis of an insanity defense.43 Similarly,
the Superior Court of Rhode Island found that a man was competent to stand trial
even though the man stated that “the judge and others involved in the trial might be
influenced by the supernatural,”44 and the Maine Supreme Court found that a
criminal defendant was legally competent to give a voluntary confession even though
the man believed he was an alien and had supernatural powers.45
In the days prior to M’Naghten, witches were widely seen as being unable to
demonstrate a state of mitigating mental culpability.46 “Indeed, witches and wizards
could never be exculpated on the ground of criminal incompetency because, by
definition, they could distinguish between right and wrong. After all, these
individuals who believed they possessed supernatural powers chose voluntarily to
follow a course which was the very embodiment of evil.”47 Today, of course, such a
claim might raise a potential defense based on mental culpability.48

________________________
40.
Id. at 1055; see also In re Hanson’s Estate, 151 P. 264 (Wash. 1915).
41.
Sano v. Sano, 949 N.Y.S.2d 780, 780 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012).
42.
See, e.g., People v. Cardenas, 21 Cal. App. 4th 927, 940 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (defendant threatened
victim with threats involving spirits).
43.
See People v. Kelley, No. F035466, 2002 WL 501651, at *56 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2002).
44.
Bevilacqua v. Knight, No. M.P. NO. 12451, 1979 WL 196116 at *12 (R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 1979).
45.
State v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620, 628 n.7 (Me. 1972).
46.
United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 616 n.24 (2d Cir. 1966).
47.
Id.
48.
See C. Clifford Allen, III, Annotation, Degree of Homicide as Affected by Accused’s Religious or Occult
Belief in Harmlessness of Ceremonial or Ritualistic Acts Directly Causing Fatal Injury, 78 A.L.R.3D 1132 (1977).
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2. Persons Claiming Supernatural Powers
Fortune tellers have been subject to prosecution in the past in the United States,49
and some states have only recently legalized fortune telling.50 Witchcraft was also
previously illegal in some states.51 Courts have generally held that it is within the
purview of the legislature to regulate fortune telling and similar activities in order
“to protect the gullible, superstitious, or unwary.”52 These laws have been upheld
despite challenges “based on due process, equal protection, privileges and
immunities, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, obligation of contract,
enablement and preemption, and other grounds.”53
Of course, persons who claim to possess supernatural powers may properly be
charged with crimes in other circumstances, if those persons act fraudulently,54 and
no physical means of deception is necessary.55 One court discussed the relationship
between criminal prosecutions and those that profess supernatural powers as follows:
Criminal statutes which prescribe punishment for false
representations primarily were intended to protect persons against
those who report falsely with respect to their earthly and material
possessions. Any legislative attempt to limit or regulate persons in
their claims to the possession of exceptional spiritual power or
knowledge would be rejected as a dangerous invasion of the state
into the realm of religious freedom and privilege, which, from the
beginning of our government, has been guarded by constitutional
barriers. The framers of our criminal statutes had in mind material
affairs and not spiritual matters nor the punishment of persons who
claim or represent themselves, by divine favor, to be endowed with
supernatural power, unless the intent to defraud is discernable in the
pretense as to the possession of supernatural powers. This power in
the instant case, according to the prosecution’s evidence, was
claimed by defendant to be derived from God agreeable with His
written word as recorded in holy scripture. That book is an open
record and all who will may solve for themselves the extent or
________________________
49.
See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Hellscher, 242 S.W. 652 (Mo. 1922). For an in-depth discussion of this
topic, see Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Regulation of Astrology, Clairvoyancy, Fortunetelling, and the Like, 91
A.L.R.3D 766 (2011).
50.
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-401.5, repealed by 2004 N.C. Sess. Law 203, § 21 (effective Aug. 17,
2004).
51.
See, e.g., State v. Durham, 58 A. 1024, 1024–25 (Del. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1904); see also Patti Wigington,
(last
updated
Feb.
16,
2016),
American
Witchcraft
Laws,
ABOUT.COM
http://paganwiccan.about.com/od/wiccanpaganhistory/fl/American-Witchcraft-Laws.htm (discussing previous laws
against witchcraft).
52.
Sarno, supra note 49.
53.
Id. § 2[a].
54.
See United States v. Calwer, 292 F. 1007, 1008 (D. Mont. 1923) (“Therein the weight of authority is that
astrologers, conjurers, fakirs, magicians, mediums, and all variety of pretenders to supernatural power, and who
assume to sell the same for money, are amenable to the criminal law of false pretenses.”); see also New v. United
States, 245 F. 710 (9th Cir. 1917) (holding that religious freedom did not preclude such a prosecution).
55.
People v. Bertsche, 106 N.E. 823, 827 (Ill. 1914).
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degree of divine power that mortals may hope to attain. Each person
is at liberty to interpret it for himself. That a mere pretender who
wittingly and fraudulently imposes upon the credulity of the weak
in mind to their financial loss, is guilty of fraud, there can be no
doubt. Persons mentally healthy will not be so imposed upon.56
Some courts have held that state of mind is irrelevant for purposes of fraud when
the legislature has regulated or prohibited these activities.57 Gregory G. Sarno, the
author of the A.L.R. annotation on the subject, noted that “attitude of judicial
disfavor toward astrology, clairvoyancy, fortunetelling, and the like has perhaps been
ameliorated by the changing attitude of the society at large, which has probably
accounted for the fact that legislatures have repealed many of the older enactments
governing such endeavors.”58
In People v. Memro, the police utilized a sketch based on a psychic’s vision in
their investigation in order to apprehend the defendant.59 The California Supreme
Court deferred to the trial court’s determination that the arrest was justified, stating
“[t]he Court finds that the use of the psychic in this case was merely an investigative
tool and cannot be relied upon by the officers in connection with justifying their
arrest. However, it may be used to follow up additional leads.”60 Conversely, in State
v. Nelson, the Supreme Court of Hawai’i ruled that the circuit court properly
suppressed statements made during a custodial interrogation in which an officer,
among other things, extracted statements from defendant through “prayer[] and
exorcism.”61
3. Performing Religious Ceremonies
Several cases have examined mens rea when a person has died while a defendant
performed an exorcism. In Clark v. State, the Texas Court of Appeals found the
elements for intentional murder were present.62 In Carson v. State, that same court
found that a criminal defendant was entitled to a lesser included offense.63 This is
largely a fact-contingent analysis.64
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina held that “[r]idding [a] child of demons”
could constitute a culpable negligent act for the purpose of voluntary manslaughter.65
The Court of Appeals of New York concluded that a defendant was entitled to an
instruction on a lesser included charge of negligent homicide, when a defendant
stated that he had religious powers:
________________________
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

People v. Blackburn, 5 P.2d 600, 604 (Cal. 1931).
Sarno, supra note 49.
Id.
People v. Memro, 11 Cal. 4th 786, 839 (Cal. 1995).
Id. at 842.
State v. Nelson, 748 P.2d 365, 371 (Haw. 1987).
Clark v. State, No. 11–10–00335, 2012 WL 5448189, at *1, *3, *4 (Tex. App. 2012).
Carson v. State, 422 S.W.3d 733, 748 (Tex. App. 2013).
See id. at 747–48.
State v. Robinson, 349 S.E.2d 317, 319 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
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[The defendant] testified that he had been of the Sudan Muslim
religious faith since birth, and had become one of the sect’s leaders,
claiming a sizable following. Defendant articulated the three central
beliefs of this religion as “cosmetic consciousness, mind over matter
and psysiomatic psychomatic consciousness.” He stated that the
second of these beliefs, “mind over matter”, empowered a “master”,
or leader, to lie on a bed of nails without bleeding, to walk through
fire or on hot coals, to perform surgical operations without
anesthesia, to raise people up off the ground, and to suspend a
person’s heartbeat, pulse, and breathing while that person remained
conscious. In one particular type of ceremony, defendant,
purportedly exercising his powers of “mind over matter”, claimed
he could stop a follower’s heartbeat and breathing and plunge knives
into his chest without any injury to the person. There was testimony
from at least one of defendant’s followers that he had successfully
performed this ceremony on previous occasions. Defendant himself
claimed to have performed this ceremony countless times over the
previous 40 years without once causing an injury. Unfortunately, on
January 28, 1972, when defendant performed this ceremony on
Kenneth Goings, a recent recruit, the wounds from the hatchet and
three knives which defendant had inserted into him proved fatal. . .
.
The defendant’s conduct and claimed lack of perception, together
with the belief of the victim and defendant’s followers, if accepted
by the jury, would justify a verdict of guilty of criminally negligent
homicide. There was testimony, both from defendant and from one
of his followers, that the victim himself perceived no danger, but in
fact volunteered to participate. Additionally, at least one of the
defendant’s followers testified that the defendant had previously
performed this ritual without causing injury. Assuming that a jury
would not believe that the defendant was capable of performing the
acts in question without harm to the victim, it still could determine
that this belief held by the defendant and his followers was indeed
sincere and that defendant did not in fact perceive any risk of harm
to the victim.66
Similarly, the performance of an exorcism, in and of itself, is unlikely to result in an
insanity defense.67

________________________
66.
67.

People v. Strong, 338 N.E.2d 602, 605 (N.Y. 1975).
Lawson v. State, 966 N.E.2d 1273, 1282–83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
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C. Family Law
The Montana Supreme Court determined that the fact that one parent was a
member of a church which performed exorcisms did not mean that the other parent
was entitled to sole custody, so that the trial court’s best-interests-of-the-child
analysis was not clearly erroneous.68
III. SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF CLAIMS
A. Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim69
Of course, a claim may also be dismissed if it is based on paranormal
phenomena. Courts have, for example, dismissed claims as frivolous in the following
circumstances: a claim in which the plaintiff alleged that the government implanted
tracking devices in his body;70 a claim asserting that the government inserted insects
into the plaintiff’s brain;71 a claim in which the plaintiff requested $50,000,000 in
compensation for providing psychic services for presidential administrations;72 a
breach of contract claim in which the defendant offered $1,000,000 in exchange for
proof of the paranormal, and refused to pay the plaintiff when the plaintiff asserted
that he had such proof;73 a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the devil had forced
the petitioner to commit a crime;74 and a complaint alleging that FBI agents were
monitoring and taping the plaintiff.75
Of course, “[c]laims involving bizarre conspiracy theories or fantastic
government manipulation of [one’s] will or mind are essentially fictitious and devoid
of merit.”76 It is also possible that a reviewing court could simply decline to address
________________________
68.
In re Marriage of Wang, 896 P.2d 450, 451–52 (Mo. 1995).
69.
For an interesting article concerning frivolous claims, see Gerald Lebovits, The Devil’s in the Details for
Delusional Claims, 75-OCT N.Y. ST. B.J. 64 (2003).
70.
Marino v. C.I.A., No. 11–813, 2012 WL 4482986, at *1 (D.D.C. 2012).
71.
Rogers v. Essex Cnty., 429 Fed. App’x 79, 81 (3d Cir. 2011).
72.
Bussie v. U.S., 96 Fed. Cl. 89, 93 (Fed. Cl. 2011).
73.
Simpson v. Zwinge, 531 Fed. App’x 985, 986 (11th Cir. 2013).
74.
Hunter v. Douglas Cnty. Dist. Court, No. 14–3048–SAC, 2014 WL 4538055, at *2 (D. Kan. 2014).
75.
The court’s discussion in that case was as follows:
Plaintiff alleges that he was taken hostage by a CIA agent that he has seen on television; that
the police have been watching him for over a decade and have bugged his house; that his
house is surrounded by “stake out” houses; that agents are leaving the stake out houses with
their guns and breaking into his house while he sleeps; and that agents are giving him death
threats. . . .
In addition, Plaintiff alleges that he is in possession of “federal camera’s [sic] that see threw
[sic] clothes and walls’, which he ‘got from my ceilin [sic] fan they light sockets”; states that
this is the reason his life is in danger; and alleges that he has been riding around with these
cameras watching agents, who are having sex with each other in the stake out houses. He
alleges that this is conspiracy to commit murder and unbecoming of an officer. He also alleges
that the agents are violating the Fourth Amendment by using such cameras.
Watkins v. F.B.I., No. 3:14–CV–00585–JGH, 2014 WL 7342811, at *2 (W.D. Ky. 2014).
76.
Marino v. C.I.A., No. 11–813, 2012 WL 4482986, at *1 (D.D.C. 2012) (quotations omitted).
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any part of a claim allegedly dealing with paranormal activity77 or sanction the
plaintiff.78
B. Lawsuits against Fictional or Supernatural Entities
Many law students quickly become familiar with the case of United States ex
rel. Gerald Mayo v. Satan and His Staff, in which a man sued Satan alleging that
“Satan has on numerous occasions caused plaintiff misery and unwarranted threats,
against the will of plaintiff, that Satan has placed deliberate obstacles in his path and
has caused plaintiff’s downfall[ ]”79 resulting in a deprivation of his constitutional
rights.80 The court denied the plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, as the
plaintiff could not obtain personal jurisdiction over the devil or comply with the
requirements for service of process.81 At least one habeas corpus suit has named God
as a defendant.82 The court, in addition to citing Mayo, dismissed the suit because
God “is not the immediate custodian of Petitioner’s present physical confinement.”83
Furthermore, in Jones v. God, a civil suit against God and Jesus was also dismissed,
with the court stating that due to a “question of service on the principal defendants,
there is no factual basis for the exercise of this court’s subject matter jurisdiction.”84
C. Psychologically Impacted Properties
In Stambovsky v. Ackley,85 the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division
held that a house in which the owner had previously advertised as being haunted was
legally haunted in a claim rescission by a subsequent purchaser.86 Despite this
intriguing language in the opinion, the actual holding of the court was that home
buyers were entitled a house’s history disclosed to them, when the house had a
history of violence.87 The opinion contains tongue-in-cheek statements such as: “if
the language of the contract is to be construed as broadly as defendant urges to
encompass the presence of poltergeists in the house, it cannot be said that she has
delivered the premises ‘vacant’ in accordance with her obligation under the
provisions of the contract rider[,]”88 and “the most meticulous inspection and the
search would not reveal the presence of poltergeists at the premises or unearth the
________________________
77.
See, e.g., State v. Gurath, 847 N.W.2d 426 (Wis. Ct. App. 2014) (failing to address the defendant’s claim
of the paranormal).
78.
See Maringo v. McGuirk, No. H–07–0403, 2007 WL 7238940, at *3 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (warning the
plaintiff that he could face sanctions); see also Roller v. James Randi Educ. Found., No. 06–4702, 2007 WL
2892018, at *4 (D. Minn. 2007) (directing the clerk of court not to accept any further cases filed by the plaintiff
unless the pleading is signed by an attorney).
79.
United States ex. rel. Mayo v. Satan and His Staff, 54 F.R.D. 282, 283 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
80.
Id.
81.
Id.
82.
Harris v. Att’y Gen. of Pa., No. 11-766, 2011 WL 3652504, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Pa. 2011).
83.
Id.
84.
Jones v. God, No. 90-0742, 1991 WL 42399, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
85.
Stambovsky v. Ackley, 169 A.D.2d 254 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
86.
Id. at 256.
87.
Id. at 260.
88.
Id. at 260.
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property’s ghoulish reputation in the community.”89 The opinion even quotes the
ghost in Shakespeare’s Hamlet.90
“Psychologically impacted” properties might include other paranormal events,
such as sites of alien abductions.91 Other jurisdictions have held that psychologically
impacted properties do not have “material defects[,]”92 or have abolished them by
statute.93
D. Subject Matter in Wills
In In Re Kidd’s Estate, a man left a will which directed as follows: “[S]ell all my
property which is all in cash and stocks with E. F. Hutton Co Phoenix some in safety
box, and have this balance money to go in a research or some scientific proof of a
soul of the human body which leaves at death[.]”94
After holding that the language above created a valid trust, the Arizona Supreme
Court then considered several different potential claimants who asserted they had
such proof. 95 One “claim[ed] she saw her soul leave her body[.]”96 Another based
his claim of proof on biblical writings.97 Another asserted that “he has engaged in
the pursuit of scientific knowledge of psychical and spiritual phenomena including
manifestations of the human soul.”98 The court dismissed one claimant who wished
only to perform secular research, stating:
Kidd was not deluded by modern secularism into assuming that the
Christian view of the world is so dull and pointless that it is not
worth investigating. The affirmation of God as taught by the
Christian Creed-the Communion of Saints, the Resurrection of the
Body, and the Life Everlasting-is more satisfying to the intellect and
more enriching to the human personality than its etiolated substitute,
scientific humanism, the pursuit of which has led to materialism and
the lack of moral responsibility.99
________________________
89.
Id. at 259.
90.
Id. at 257.
91.
Paula C. Murray, Past or Present Environmental Contamination: Another Disclosure Duty for a Real
Estate Broker?, 25 REAL EST. L.J. 191, 193 (1996).
92.
Milliken v. Jacono, 60 A.3d 133, 141 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012), aff’d, 103 A.3d 806 (Pa. 2014).
While the murder/suicide may have been subjectively material to Buyer’s decision, we hold
that under common law fraud a seller of real estate is only liable for failing to reveal objective
material defects. Psychological damage to real estate does not constitute a defect that the law
is presently prepared to recognize as material.
Id.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 114 (West 2015); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 82.68 (West 2014).
In re Kidd’s Estate, 479 P.2d 697, 699 (Ariz. 1971).
Id. at 700.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 701.
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The Arizona Supreme Court then instructed the lower court to make a determination
as to which of the remaining claimants would be best suited to seek proof of the
human soul.100
E. Contracts101
In Pando by Pando v. Fernandez,102 a minor plaintiff agreed to pray for the
defendant to win the lottery, buy a lottery ticket, and select the numbers.103 In
exchange, the defendant agreed to split her winnings with the plaintiff.104 One of the
plaintiff’s tickets actually won $2.8 million, and the defendant refused to split the
proceeds with the plaintiff.105
The defendant contended that it was impossible for the plaintiff to prove that a
contract ever existed.106 After stating that plaintiff’s prayer was apparently a
condition precedent for the fulfillment of any contract,107 the court stated that “[i]t is
not a sufficient answer that he prayed, and that one of the tickets he filled out was
the winner. That would leave a gap in the proof, which must demonstrate not merely
that winning followed prayer, but that plaintiff’s prayer was the causative factor in
winning.”108 In other words, “[t]o recover, plaintiff must demonstrate that his prayers
caused the miracle to occur.”109 The court then stated as follows:
How can we really know what happened? Is a court to engage in the
epistemological inquiry as to the acquisition of knowledge and
belief through proof or through faith? Faith is the antithesis of proof.
It is a belief which is firmly held even though demonstrable proof
may be lacking. It is instinctive, spiritual, and profound, arrived at
not through a coldly logical appraisal of the facts but, in
Wordsworth’s phrase, by “a passionate intuition”. . . .
How, then, in a court of law, set up to require tangible proof, in a
mundane setting, can a litigant establish that his faith and his prayers
brought about a miracle? Perhaps they did, but there is no way to
prove that in a modern courtroom.110
After a brief discussion of the history of “proving” miracles through the law, the
court concluded that such proof in modern courts would be impossible:
________________________
100.
In re Kidd’s Estate, 479 P.2d at 704.
101.
See C. S. Patrinelis, Annotation, Undue Influence in Nontestamentary Gift to Clergyman, Spiritual
Adviser, or Church, 14 A.L.R.2D 649 (1950).
102.
Pando v. Fernandez, 485 N.Y.S.2d 162 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984). For an article that discusses this case in
more detail, see Robert Birmingham, Proving Miracles and the First Amendment, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 45 (1996).
103.
Pando, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 164.
104.
Id.
105.
Id.
106.
Id.
107.
Id. at 167.
108.
Id.
109.
Pando, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 168.
110.
Id.
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The argument for ignoring the condition essentially is that plaintiff
has done all he humanly could. He has performed as completely as
he was able, and he should not be penalized because he cannot
demonstrate that he brought about heavenly intervention. But
heavenly intervention is exactly what defendant bargained for—that
her pious young friend would bring about a miracle. It was not an
incidental part of the agreement—it was its essence, its very heart
and soul. Is she to be deprived of half the return on her investment,
and plaintiff rewarded, because she was naive and gullible? Elision
of the unprovable condition (tantamount to proof by default) would
result in a rewriting of the contract into something other than what
the parties intended. Defendant did not bargain for a propitious
coincidence but for a miracle. If she believed it to have happened,
she was free to show her appreciation or to withhold it, but a court
could not compel her to do so. “There are no guarantees in life, and
good fortune . . . does not invariably bring with it a life-long
annuity.”111
“Conjuring” and “performing incantations” over a sick man in order to cure him
has also been held insufficient consideration for a promissory note.
Our conclusion is that “conjuring” over a sick man “to make him
well” is not a valid consideration for a promissory note; and that no
man with a healthy mind would voluntarily give a note for $250,
with interest at two per cent[] a month, for the services of a conjurer,
who proposes to cure a lingering disease by conjury or
incantations.112
Another court refused to consider that anything supernatural could ever be the
subject of a contract, in a case in which the defendant promised to join a religion.113
The New York Supreme Court stated,
[r]eason cannot encompass the supernatural. Divine faith is
supernatural. It seems that the recognition of the alleged fraud in this
case eventually would require the civil courts to undertake to solve
problems and to answer questions which are outside the civil aspects
of marriage and should be left with the parties and their respective
religious affiliations for possible solution.114

________________________
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 169.
Cooper v. Livingston, 19 Fla. 684, 694 (1883).
Nilsen v. Nilsen, 66 N.Y.S.2d 204, 207 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946).
Id.
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Finally, a person who claims to have supernatural powers might give rise to a
claim of undue influence if the person exercises this control over an unduly
susceptible person.115
F. Torts
Of course, persons claiming to possess supernatural powers might properly be
the subject of a claim of fraud.116 In Haimes v. Temple University Hospital, the
plaintiff began experiencing frequent headaches after she received an x-ray from the
defendant physician,117 and she allegedly lost her psychic abilities.118 The court
remanded the case for a new trial119 after the jury awarded the plaintiff a $600,000
verdict.120 Though the court had previously disallowed any proof of the loss of the
plaintiff’s psychic abilities, the court reasoned that the jury likely did not follow
these instructions.121
In Glatzel v. Brittle, the defendant provided a “non-fiction” account of the
plaintiff’s “demonic possession” to an author,122 which was published in the book
The Devil in Connecticut.123 The court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for invasion of
privacy, stating that publication of the facts alleged would not be highly offensive to
a reasonable person.124 The court next dismissed the plaintiff’s suit for libel as he
had not alleged that the events described in the book were false.125 The court also
dismissed the plaintiff’s claim under intentional infliction of emotional distress
because the court found that the publication of the book did not rise to the level of
extreme and outrageous conduct.126
The Texas Supreme Court has held that there could be no recovery for the
“laying of hands” by a plaintiff who had suffered no physical damages, stating that
“determining the circumstances of [the plaintiff]’s emotional injuries would, by its
very nature, draw the Court into forbidden religious terrain . . . .”127 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an allegation that a person has had
an exorcism performed upon him or her is also insufficient to support a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.128

________________________
115.
116.
powers).
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co., 395 F. Supp. 221, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
See, e.g., Mahler v. Beishline, 46 Colo. 603 (Colo. 1909) (defendant claimed to have supernatural healing
Haimes v. Temple Univ. Hosp., 39 Pa. D. & C. 3d 381, 385 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1986).
Id.
Id. at 414.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 397–98.
Glatzel v. Brittle, No. DBCV084008461S, 2010 WL 4620975, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2010).
Id.
Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *3–4.
Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 12–13 (Tex. 2008).
Bodett v. CoxCom, Inc., 366 F.3d 736, 747 (9th Cir. 2004).
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Another unique problem is presented when one libels another using the
paranormal.129 Though some courts have allowed a recovery when the defendant has
ascribed a belief in Satanism or the occult to the plaintiff,130 others have not.131 Such
a statement, even if taken as true, might not be libelous. “On their face, we do not
find that the words ‘voodoo practitioner’ and ‘practicer of voodoo magic’ are
defamatory. These words are ambiguous in that while they might create connotations
of evil and wrongdoing, they might also create a connotation of mysterious power
and special ability.”132 These statements might also be a constitutionally protected
opinion.133
Finally, a court might hold that a recovery by a plaintiff is barred because such
allegations could not possibly be true if the words impute the supernatural. For
example, in one case the defendant stated of the plaintiff, “[w]hen one hisses as she
does, they are possessed of the devil and she and her brother surely are evil
looking.”134 The Court held that there could be no recovery, and added “one finds a
definition of the supposed evil which collides head-on with a present-day
wonderment that witchcraft could ever have been practiced. Yet, this is the innuendo
asserted.”135
G. Evidence136
Another unique problem is presented when a party seeks to introduce evidence
which was allegedly obtained through paranormal means. Though early case law
provided that a court should not allow a person to demonstrate his or her supernatural
powers,137 witnesses would occasionally testify regarding the paranormal.138 Even
before Daubert, appellate courts would generally still decline to consider any
evidence that was allegedly obtained through the paranormal.139 Daubert, no doubt,
was adopted in order to prevent rulings such as this one:
________________________
129.
For a much more in-depth discussion of this topic, see Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Imputation of
Allegedly Objectionable Political or Social Beliefs or Principles as Defamation, 62 A.L.R.4TH 314.
130.
Id. at § 20[a] (citing Stow v. Converse, 3 Conn 325, 325, 342 (1820)); New Testament Missionary
Fellowship v. E.P. Dutton & Co. 112 A.D.2d 55 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
131.
See Sarno, supra note 129, at § 20[b].
132.
Id. (citing Buller v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 684 S.W.2d 473, 479 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)).
133.
Id. (citing Holy Spirit Ass’n for the Unification of World Christianity v. Sequoia Elsevier Pub. Co. 75
A.D.2d 523 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)).
134.
Stickles v. Manss, 114 A.2d 771, 774 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1955).
135.
Id. at 775.
136.
See George L. Blum, Admissibility and Prejudicial Effect of Evidence, in Criminal Prosecution, of
Defendant’s Involvement with Witchcraft, Satanism, or the Like, 18 A.L.R.5TH 804 (1994); see also Hughes v. State,
508 N.E.2d 1289, 1297 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (Testimony that defendant believed another person was possessed by a
demon was admissible to show defendant’s attitude.).
137.
United States v. Ried, 42 F. 134, 136 (W.D. Mich. 1890).
138.
See Geffert v. Kayser, 192 N.W. 26, 30 (Wis. 1923) (“There is some testimony . . . in regard to having
the exact place of the accident indicated to her by some supernatural force, that bears upon the weight and credibility
of her testimony. It is not repeated here, because [it is] not deemed material upon the questions presented.”); see
also Chapa v. United States, 261 F. 775, 776 (5th Cir. 1919) (“[T]he refusal of the court to permit more than 13
witnesses for the defense to testify that they had been cured by defendants’ daughter . . . was material . . . [to] . . .
defendants’ good faith, as showing their own belief in the possession by their daughter of the occult power claimed
for her.”).
139.
One court said as follows:
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No further attempt was made to develop the exact nature of these
whisperings, so whether such development would have shown these
to be merely the promptings of conscience that come to all of us, or
that the victim actually believed she heard supernatural voices, we
know not, but, giving the defendant the benefit of the doubt, and
conceding that the evidence shows his victim believes she hears or
has heard supernatural voices, she is not the first one to claim to
have heard such voices, there are others, for example: Moses,
Socrates, Saul of Tarsus, Mohamet, Emanuel Swedenborg, the
second Earl Grey of England, Joan of Arc, Bernadette Soubirous,
etc. We are neither prepared or disposed to go into an extended
discussion of this, but the citation of these names of persons who,
by what they have said and done, have affected the lives of vast
numbers of mankind, is enough to show that such a claim does not
render one incredible. All of this was for the jury to consider in
determining whether or not to believe her testimony.140
“Human polygraphs,” or those who claim to instinctively know when a person
is lying, are generally prohibited as evidence.141 At least one court has held that
impeachment evidence that a witness participated in Satanic worship, including that
the witness had been possessed by a demon and had previously given his soul to the
devil to save a child’s life, was within the discretion of a trial judge.142 Furthermore,
a federal court in Michigan ruled that there was no violation of a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause right when he was disallowed from questioning
the complaining witness in regards to statements that she was sexually assaulted by
a demon. 143

________________________
If a man comes into court claiming to possess supernatural powers and brings with him
witnesses who swear he has done for them that which we know is impossible, we are not
required to believe such evidence. Here was a woman, who perhaps believed what she said,
who testified that by a mental process of one of these plaintiffs, transmitted to her through a
letter several hundreds of miles away, she was entirely cured of a cancer of the breast. The
fact that the plaintiff, who was supposed to have transmitted the influence from Nevada, was
not there at the time does not add to the absurdity of the statement. And the testimony of other
witnesses, perhaps also sincere, to the effect that they were cured of otherwise incurable
diseases by such mysterious process can have absolutely no lodgment in our intelligence.
Sexton v. Metro. St. Ry. Co., 149 S.W. 21, 25 (Mo. 1912). See also Elsworth v. Glindmeyer, 234 So. 2d 312, 321
(Miss. 1970) (“No court is required to believe, or should be bound by improbable, incredulous, or unreasonable
evidence supporting a verdict, as in the case at bar, which is violative of physical laws, human experience and
common sense, and which intrudes into the realm of the supernatural.”).
140.
McPerkin v. Commonwealth, 33 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Ky. Ct. App. 1930).
141.
Flynn v. State, 847 P.2d 1073, 1075–76 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
142.
State v. Ware, No. 03C01-9705CR00164, 1999 WL 233592, at *18 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).
143.
Piscopo v. Michigan, No. 2:07-CV-15398, 2010 WL 4942660, at *7-8 (E.D. Mich. 2010).
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IV. CONCLUSION
There is little place for discussion of the supernatural within the hallowed halls
of academia, and some in academia have expressed their outright hostility to the
subject.144 In many of the cases in which one of the parties has a subjective belief in
the paranormal, the court chooses not to engage in a substantive analysis of the
paranormal.145 This, presumably, is to preserve the integrity of the legal process.146
However, occasionally a non-frivolous claim will implicate the paranormal.147 In
these instances, some courts mention the fact that subjects of religion are commonly
accepted, with the seeming implication that such occurrences are not outside the
realm of remote possibility.148 Other courts, such as the New York Superior Court,
simply ask, “How can we really know what happened?”149
Similarly to the cases discussed herein, there is no real conclusion to this article.
The subject matter of these claims is too subjective and unprovable. Regardless, by
studying this subject, lawyers and judges might look inwardly to discover not only
the appropriate boundaries of the legal system generally, but also the extent to which
the unprovable can ever be proved in a court of law.

________________________
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

See Warner, supra note 23.
See Goldberg v. R. Grier Miller & Sons, Inc., 182 A.2d 759, 761 (Pa. 1962).
Id.
See, e.g., Pando v. Fernandez, 485 N.Y.S.2d 162, 164 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
McPerkin v. Commonwealth, 33 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Ky. Ct. App. 1930).
Pando, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 168.
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